BOTILENECKS (UNION-MADE INCLUDED)
JAM s

AoNn

McLAuGmaN*

R. ARNOLD is doing an important piece of work and doing
it well, probably better than it has ever been done before.
Consequently one wonders how he can find time to write a
book.x One should expect not leisurely scholarship, but an expression of
the working creed of a busy man. To be enjoyed, the work should be
skimmed rapidly, because the more it is analyzed the more doubts it
raises.
The basic ideas are not new. Private monopolies and privately controlled markets are not to be tolerated. The main trouble with the antitrust laws, as Professor Fetter said years ago, is that they have not been
enforced well enough. Mr. Arnold says the way to enforce them is to enlarge the anti-trust staff and then concentrate fire on one related group of
industries at a time, the way he is doing: first on the building industry,
then on the food industry, etc. According to Mr. Arnold, lack of antitrust laws produced Hitler, the downfall of France, the original weakness
of England, and the inequalities of income in this country which he assumes or believes prevent the full enjoyment of our productive capacity.
Whether the enforcement of anti-trust laws will cure baldness and ingrowing toenails is left to the imagination.
There is no concession that other factors contributed to the state of the
world's difficulties, nor is there any discussion of such problems as the real
cut-throat competition brought about by the tendency of competitive
prices to approach variable costs in industries where fixed costs are of
overwhelming importance. Nothing is said about the operation of the free
competitive system in industries where bankrupt competitors do not go to
the wall but merely show up as reorganized concerns with their fixed costs
written off, prepared to force a forfeiture of previous investment throughout the industry.
Perhaps the key to the author's method is to be found when he says:
"Social institutions respond to pressures, not to logical thinking."2 The
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work is masterly high-pressure salesmanship. It helps to explain how the
author, without any obvious help from the international situation, enlarged his staff in a manner rivaled only by the espionage and sabotage
sections of the Axis consulates. Fortunately for the country his purpose is
more benevolent.
Opinions may differ concerning what constitutes logical thinking. Mr.
Arnold employs a series of sharp assertions. One predisposed to his point
of view may be lulled into an uncritical acceptance of the assertions, and
the cumulative effect of accepting many such statements is to put pressure
back of the point of view. But any attempt to prove and to test the assertions one by one is fatal. I, for one, still think he is probably qualitatively
right, although quantitatively extravagant in his conclusions, and I refuse
to abandon that point of view merely because the author seems to hold it
in order to bring such a series of false, questionable and inscrutable assertions to its support.
Perhaps the second touchstone to the work is the manifestly incorrect
statement that enforcement of the Sherman Act (before his incumbency) had been used only for private purposes. 3 The footnote contains a
criticism of "a well-known economist 'S3 to the effect that this assertion is
wrong in fact and bad policy as scarcely courteous to the author's predecessors in office. But the author continues in the note: "I decided to let
the paragraph stand because I consider it as accurate as any broad generalization can be." The fact seems to be that Mr. Arnold is temperamentally incapable of making an accurate statement. The work bristles
with such words as "always," "never," "everybody" and "nobody." Possibly, for some purposes, it may suffice to say that all Americans are white
or that potatoes are nothing but water, for both statements are what those
who deal in "broad generalizations" with a fine contempt for hairsplitting
would support as ninety per cent correct. If any reasoning is to be based
on such statements, however, the only safe course is to brand them for
what they are, unquestionably false assertions.
The following is a rather extreme example of what may pass for reasoning in the book. 4 "In 1920 the American farmer got 5o of each dollar
spent by the American consumer. He was spending that 5o to buy manufactured products. Today he gets only 3oO of each consumer's dollar. He
cannot buy the same proportion of manufactured goods. He has lost forty
per cent of his proportionate purchasing power. That loss expressed in
3 P. 164.
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dollars is $i,8oo,ooo,ooo each year. The manufacturer did not get this
money. It has simply disappeared."
As a country advances from a simple homespun economy into the
mechanized age, one would expect the relative importance of the farmer's
products to decrease. If the author thinks this process has not been continuing since 192o, he might say so and give his reasons. Perhaps one
reason the farmer makes a worse showing now than in 1920 is because the
farmer was then fattening on the necessities of a war-devastated Europe.
Later, too much economic nationalism throughout the world and the success of the New Deal in keeping our farm prices high enough to deprive
our farmer of a large part of the overseas markets otherwise available to
him, are potent factors which the author ignores. The reader has by this
time guessed the sole reason assigned-lack of enforcement of the Sherman Act. In any event, is it necessary to take Sophomore Economics in
order to balk at the assertion that a large sum of "money" "simply disappeared"?
A family man living across the road from Mr. Arnold has been off and
on relief for several years. When he finally saved $5o he squandered it on
the down payment on a $40o used car, because he said he could not get
relief if he had cash, but he could get relief if he had a car that was not paid
for.5 Now, says Mr. Arnold, having a car, gasoline is a necessity for him,
and any rise in the price of gasoline will cause him to be just that much
more of a burden on the relief rolls.6 But do not get the idea that there is
any criticism of the New Deal or of the administration of relief implied in
this picture. The New Deal is swallowed whole and without salt, down to
and including the "Court packing" plan. All kinds of subsidies are accepted as politically inevitable and this assertion is given some color by
reference to the rather cowardly Republican platform of 194o, and of
course the dismal history of the tariff in this country might as well have
been included. "Political facts," says Mr. Arnold with characteristic assertiveness and with less than his usual vulnerability, "are far more important economic facts than anything any professor thinks up in a classroom."
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Except for its extravagant inaccuracy, the work has much the orientation of the hearings of the Temporary National Economic Committee.
The "recession" of late 1937 put the public in the mood for a scape-goat.
When it appeared that the New Deal might be cast in that role, the adSP. 21.
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ministration adroitly pointed out that there was much to be investigated
besides itself, and, with the able assistance of Mr. Arnold among others,
staged a pretty good show with the "monopoly investigation."
One gets the idea that Mr. Arnold misleads from a sort of exhuberant
impatience and not from moral turpitude. For a militant, one-eyed New
Dealer he makes a most significant and frank admission that "the bitterness against enforcement of collective bargaining is due in large part to
the fact that it was superimposed on a situation where collective bargaining was being used for purposes that could not be justified." 8 He refers
primarily to the sort of gangster rule that has prevented free elections in
some unions 9 and the way unions are frequently used as the means of
collecting private graft for racketeers," ° but he also cites cases of inexcusable jurisdictional disputes " and unconscionable exactions of tribute,
such as wages for unneeded "stand-by" men." And still his chapter on
this subject breathes the subserviency to organized labor apparently endemic in the Washington climate. He sets forth a letter to a labor union
official in which he wishes "to make it dear that it is only such boycotts,
strikes or coercion by labor unions as have no reasonable connection with
wages, hours, health, safety, the speed-up system or ....
collective bargaining which will be prosecuted."'3 Imagine assuring employers that he
would prosecute only such contracts, combinations or coercion as have no
reasonable connection with profits or market conditions! This Washington climate has been fostered by such distorted emphasis as is represented
by many volumes of La Follette committee investigations of infringements of civil liberties and the rights of labor, with a studied official
ignorance of the labor conditions against which employers have been
struggling. The Norris-La Guardia Act 4 first closed the federal courts to
employers and others damaged by intimidating acts by laborers and professional agitators acting in the name of labor. Injunctions could only be
obtained against acts of fraud or actual violence and subject to procedural
restrictions and delays which left open a Wide area for effective intimidation. This was reinforced by a wide definition of a labor dispute so that
8 P. 242.

9P. 246.
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"XPp. 242-43. In describing the facts of the Anheuser-Busch situation in St. Louis which
led him to institute prosecutions of William Hutcheson and others, the author omits an important fact alleged in his indictments. The brewery's plant and the plant of a neighboring
concern were blockaded by a carpenter's union in an attempt to get work belonging to another
union under the terms of outstanding contracts with both unions.
P. 251.
13P. 249.
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persons with whom neither an employer nor his employees had any dealings or any wish to deal could establish a strike or other "labor dispute"
by the mere fact of trying to interfere with the business. This law was
passed on the claim that federal judges were unduly employer-minded and
that the state injunctions and state criminal law would afford ample opportunity for the administration of justice. In important industrial states,
however, "baby Norris-La Guardia acts"' s soon hobbled the state chancery courts in a like fashion, and tie-ups between corrupt local politicians
and the strengthened labor racketeers plus the natural difficulties of proof
have rendered the criminal law even more impotent than formerly to
afford the employer protection within the law. This has naturally increased the pressure upon the employer to protect himself by self-help.
In the meantime, moreover, he is severely squeezed by the staff of the
National Labor Relations Board, largely manned by labor partisans who
are interested not in fair administration but in "carrying out the policy of
the act," which they conceive to be to force outside unionization on all
industry without reference to the ignorance or the corruption of the union
leadership and without reference to the beneficial operation of particular
open shops, or particular company unions. Thus, discharges of union men
for whatever cause are commonly found to be discriminatory discharges
and the employer frequently signs a dosed-shop contract in the hope of
reducing the area within which he can be subjected to unjust harrassment.
Once having carried appeasement this far, however, he is likely to find
himself up against the proposition of having to contend with union
leaders who feel pressure to conquer more territory every year in order to
justify their jobs.
The bitterness is not caused solely by cases of racketeering, but relates
more often to various manifestations of labor's idea that its interests are
protected by absolute "rights," which may be exercised regardless of how
many innocent people may be hurt. This partisan point of view has recently cropped up in connection with defense contracts. Even adopting
is
The New York act permits injunctions against fraud, violence and "breach of the peace."
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Ann. (Gilbert-Bliss, Supp. i94o) § 876a. The Pennsylvania act comes closer
to permitting relief against intimidation by leaving the way open to injunctions against misrepresentation, duress, breach of the peace or threat thereof. Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp.
1940) tit. 43 §§ 2o6a-2o6h. The Massachusetts act does not positively bar injunctions against
intimidating picketing, but requires proof that officers charged with protecting the plaintiff's
property are unable or unwilling to do so. Mass. Ann. Laws (1933) c. 214, § 9; ibid. (Supp.
1935) c. 214, § 9a. The big practical difficulty in Massachusetts is that it is frequently hard
to establish in court the well-known fact that truckmen are reluctant to go through picket
lines because it is generally impracticable to protect them from violence at a distance from
the plant.
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the presumption more legalistic than practical that an adverse finding of
the labor board means that an employer has really committed violations
of the National Labor Relations Act, that would seem a poor reason to
deprive the country of his contribution to acceleration of the vital defense
program. Few sane people would think of eliminating plants because of
breaches of the Federal Trade Commission Act or of the income tax laws.
All of those laws have sanctions which may be invoked without adding
sanctions in derogation, of the public interest.
The author apparently would leave the impression that his department
can clean up the labor situation if given enough funds, but the New Deal
majority on the Supreme Court has thoroughly obstructed him from doing
such portion of the job as may have been originally accessible to him.
Since the book appeared, the Court has decided that the Norris-La Guardia Act emasculates the Sherman Act as a means of preventing depredations by labor, 6but Mr. Arnold was confronted with the Apex case' 7 at the
time he wrote. In order to apply the National Labor Relations Act to the
extent demanded by labor, the Court, under strong pressure from the
"Court-packing" plan, in 1937, overthrew substantially all established
limitations upon the concept of what directly and substantially affects
interstate commerce so as to come within the commerce clause of the
Constitution. 8 The Apex case, in i94o, presented the question whether
the New Deal majority would take the bitter with the sweet and recognize
the extension of the interstate commerce power to reach the excesses of
labor. As was then to be anticipated, however, the majority found an
opening in minor variations in the language between the Sherman Act and
the Labor Act, and decided that Congress did not try to use all its power
in the Sherman Act and, as was less a foregone conclusion, the opinion was
written by Mr. Justice Stone. Mr. Arnold, however, claims that the Apex
case vindicated the position of his department by omitting to overrule the
well established proposition that the Sherman Act applies to laborers just
as it applies to others. In view of his political sense, however, it is doubtful if he takes this victory at its face value. If so, he is the dupe of a very
transparent maneuver, for, while the Sherman Act was left applicable to
labor on paper, most of the substance was subtracted by the novel docx6

Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products, 61 S. Ct.

122

(1940).

17 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (i94o), discussed at length elsewhere in this
issue.
X8NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 3oi U.S. 58 (1937). Later cases mopped
up possible remnants of the former law. Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. NLRB, 303 U.S.
444 (1938); NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 6oi (i939).
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trine that the emphasis of the cases on price control establishes such
identity between price control and restraint of trade that the former is
indispensable to the latter. This doctrine is of course construed in the light
of the rule that concerted action by laborers to control their own prices
(wages) is lawful, so they can violate the act only by conspiring to control
somebody else's prices. Such conspiracies are naturally not usual in fact
and they can be established by evidence only where the unions openly
operate as the strong-arm squads for trade associations, or where, as
in the Second Coronado case,' 9 witnesses are unusually free from intimidation. Consequently Mr. Arnold's victory here, while not perhaps Italian
in character, can hardly rate above a Dunkirk. A glorious evacuation may
leave hope of a resurgence. If labor is given enough rope and hangs itself
without hanging the country, the possibility of eventual relief through
federal legislation should not seem too Utopian. The refreshing spectacle
will then be presented of the "forward-looking" Court fighting the rear
guard action.
'9

Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. :295 (1925).

